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Case No. 20141172-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
CARL IvlACK COURTNEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distributing or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was caught selling methamphetamine in an undercover 
sting set up by the Weber-Morgan Narcotic Strike Force. At trial, a retired 
agent with the sh·ike force was called as part of the jury venire. When asked 
if anyone knew either Defendant or defense counsel, the retired agent stated 
that she had had "affiliations with him" through the strike force. She did 
not offer and was not asked whether the "him" was Defendant or his 
counsel. She was excused for cause. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defense counsel later passed the jury for cause. And after the jury 
was sworn, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. He argued that the 
retired agent's comment tainted the jury because the agent's familiarity with 
Defendant through her job on the task force would inform them that 
Defendant was involved in drugs. Defense counsel explained that he 
postponed the motion to avoid raising the issue before the jury. The trial 
court denied the motion both because it was untimely and because the 
cmnment was not prejudicial. 
At trial, the jury heard (1) evidence establishing that Defendant was 
familiar to the task force; and (2) Defendant's admission that he had sold 
drugs before. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Has defendant overcmne the strong presumption that postponing the 
mistrial motion fell within the wide range of reasonable assistance? Has 
Defendant shown that the excused juror's com1nent denied a trial before an 
impartial jury where the evidence at trial established the very thing he says 
her comment implied? 
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance claim raised for the first 
time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, iJ16, 247 P.3d 
344. 
-2-
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendu1n A: 
• Utah Code Annotated§ 58-37-8(1) (Utah Controlled Substance 
Act) 
• Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (selection of the jury) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Detective Vanderwarf worked undercover for the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics strike force. R.302:95, 102-103. He was assigned to accompany a 
confidential informant to buy sixty dollars' worth of methamphetamine 
from someone named "Skittles" at the Value Place Motel in Ogden. 
R.302:103-104, 127, 145, 147, 154. Det. Vanderwarf's assignment was not to 
arrest Skittles; rather, his job was to gain access to and information about 
the local drug scene. R.302:124. By "starting out buying small" and 
"working up the chain," Det. Vanderwarf and the strike force hoped to find 
the "big[] fish" who supplied the area's drugs. Id. 
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and conflicting evidence is presented 
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal. See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ,r2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
-3-
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Before the buy, Agent Ryan-who was supervising the operation-
outfitted the informant with a live feed and audio recorder. R.302:105, 117-
118, 127, 146. Agent Ryan also searched the informant to ensure that he did 
not have any drugs or weapons on him. R.302:105, 146-147. He found 
neither on the informant. Id. Agent Ryan then gave the informant sixty 
dollars to purchase the drugs. Id. 
With agents from the strike force monitoring Det. Vanderwarf and 
the informant through the live feed, Det. Vanderwarf and the informant left 
for Skittles's motel room. R.302:105-106, 117-118. After knocking and 
entering the room, they discovered four people there. R.302:107, 109. A 
man and woman were standing near the door in a kitchenette area. 
R.302:107-110, 131, 132; State's Ex. 3. Just past the kitchenette, a man was 
sitting on a chair at a small table. R.302:109, 130; State's Ex. 3. He was 
wearing a black beanie. R.302:109, 111; State's Ex. 3. And on the far side of 
the room, a third man was lying on the farther of two beds watching TV. 
R.302:109-110, 129, 132; State's Ex. 3. 
The informant, with Det. Vanderwarf following, walked over to the 
man at the table wearing the black beanie. R.302:110-111. Det. Vanderwarf 
noticed that there were no drugs on the table. R.302:139. Both stopped next 
to the table, standing about three to four feet away from the man in the 
-4-
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beanie. R.302:111, 131, 133. This man started "fiddling with something," or 
"preparing something." R.302:133. Det. Vanderwarf could not see what it 
was because his view was "partially blocked" by the informant. R.302:131, 
133. While the man in the black beanie was "preparing" the "something," 
the man in the kitchenette passed the informant a gold coin and they talked 
about how much it might be worth. R.302:113, 121, 131, 136-137. 
After a couple of minutes, the informant pointed to something on the 
table and asked the man in the black beanie, "is that me right there?" 
R.302:121-122, 133; State's Ex. 1 (audio recording from informant's 
recorder). The man in the black beanie answered, "I don't know." 
R.302:138; State's Ex. 1. In response, the informant asked if it was sixty 
dollars. R.302:122; State's Ex. 1. Det. Vanderwarf then watched the 
"informant hand the [man in the black beanie] the sixty dollars." R.302:113. 
In return, the man in the black beanie handed something to the informant. 
R.302:113-115. The informant immediately passed it to Det. Vanderwarf. 
Id. It was a small baggie filled with a "white crystal substance." R.302:113-
115; State's Ex. 6. It later tested positive for methamphetamine. R.302:166-
168; State's Ex. 4. 
Besides Det. Vanderwarf, the informant, and the man in the black 
beanie, "there was nobody else standing around that table" during the 
-5-
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transaction. R.302:139, 171-172. The man in the bedroom remained on the 
bed the entire time and the 1nan and woman stayed in the kitchenette. 
R.302:110, 115, 141. 
After receiving the baggie, Det. Vanderwarf and the informant left the 
motel room. R.302:116. As they walked back to their rendezvous spot 
where Agent Ryan was waiting for them, the informant told Det. 
Vanderwarf that Skittles was actually the man who had been lying on the 
bed and that they had purchased the drugs from "Carl." R.302:116, 122-123. 
Det. Vanderwarf had heard the name Carl before. R.302:116. Other agents 
on the strike force were also "familiar" with Carl and they showed Det. 
Vanderwarf a photo. R.302:117. Det. Vanderwarf told them "yes," "[t]his 
was the person we just bought dope from." R.302:117. 
Four months later, Det. Vanderwarf arrested Carl. R.302:124-125. He 
asked Carl if he had sold meth in the last six months. R.302:126, 140. Carl 
"nodded" yes and explained that "he sells to make ends meet." Id. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant Carl Courtney was charged with dish·ibuting or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony. R.6. He pleaded 
not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. R.1.6; R.302. 
-6-
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I ury Selectiou 
After some preliminary questions, the trial court asked members of 
the jury venire to introduce themselves by reporting aloud the "general 
information" about themselves that they had answered in a juror 
questionnaire. R.302:11-21. On her turn, prospective Juror 5 said that she 
"recently retired as a sergeant with the Riverdale Police Department" and 
that her "husband recently retired fro1n the Weber County Sheriff's Office 
and now is in private probation." R.302:14. 2 
After jury venire' s introductions, the prosecutor introduced himself 
and named the witnesses that he would call at trial, including Det. 
Vanderwarf. R.302:21-22. When asked if anyone knew the prosecutor or 
the State's witnesses, prospective Juror 5 was one of three veniremen who 
raised her hand. R.302:22-23. Prospective Juror 5 explained that she knew 
Det. Vanderwarf from "work" and that they were "friends." R.302:22. 
When asked if any members of the venire knew either defense 
counsel or Defendant, prospective Juror 5 again raised her hand and said, 
"Due to my years in law enforcement, yes. I have had affiliations with him, 
especially during the time that I was serving as an agent for the Weber-
2 During jury selection, prospective Juror 5 was identified by name. 
See generally R.302:22-44. To protect her privacy, however, the State refers to 
her by her juror number in its brief. See R.302:57 (identifying as Juror 5). 
-7-
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Morgan Narcotics Strike Force." R.302:23 (emphasis added). Another 
prospective juror immediately stated that she knew defense counsel because 
he had represented her husband in a case. Id. The State, the trial court, and 
defense counsel asked prospective Juror 5 no follow-up questions or 
otherwise commented on her statement. Id. 
Later, the trial court asked the venire if "any of you believe that 
because the defendant has been charged in this case by the State that there 
must be some basis for his guilt?" R.302:39. Prospective Juror 5 raised her 
hand. R.302:39, 60. Before allowing prospective Juror 5 to respond, the trial 
court asked counsel to approach. R.302:39. At a bench conference, the trial 
court expressed concern that prospective Juror 5 could "taint[] the jury 
pool" if she answered the question in front of the venire. R.302:39. The 
prosecutor suggested that prospective Juror 5 "be excused." R.302:40. 
Defense counsel stated that he was not sure "how to handle this," but 
proposed that prospective Juror 5 be taken to the trial court's chambers to 
answer the question. R.302:40. The trial court, however, suggested that it 
excuse prospective Juror 5 under the pretense that she had a conflict with 
the trial court because her husband appeared before the court as a probation 
officer. R.302:41. That way, the h·ial court explained, prospective Juror S's 
dismissal would not be connected to any of the jury selection questions. Id. 
-8-
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After further discussion, defense counsel agreed that the trial court's 
suggestion was the "best approach." R.302:42-43. He rejected the 
suggestion that the remaining members of the venire be asked curative 
questions after prospective Juror 5 was excused. Id. While defense counsel 
agreed that prospective Juror S's answer to whether she knew Defendant or 
defense counsel "sort of goes to the whole 404 issue . . . in a very 
roundabout way without being specific," he felt further questions would be 
"loaded" and would simply draw the venire' s attention to the issue. 
R.302:42-43. 
The trial court thus excused prospective Juror 5, explaining that it 
was doing so because her husband appeared before the court as a probation 
officer. R.37; R.302:43-44, 46. The trial court did not ask the venire any 
curative questions, but n1oved on with voir dire, asking if any of the 
remaining members of the venire believed that because Defendant had been 
charged by the State "that there must be some basis for his guilt." R.302:44-
45. No one answered affirmatively. R.302:45. Likewise, no one agreed that 
he or she would give more weight to law enforcement testimony or that he 
or she could not follow the law as instructed by the trial court. R.302:45. 
-9-
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Defense counsel then passed the jury for cause. R.302:49. After the 
parties exercised their preemptory challenges, the jury was sworn. 
R.302:55-56. 
The trial court then took a recess and defense counsel put on the 
record the circumstances surrounding prospective Juror 5' s excusal. 
R.302:57. He explained that prospective Juror 5 knew Defendant from her 
time on the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force and that Defendant had 
even "testified at a grand jury on issues where she set up controlled buys." 
R.302:57. While defense counsel conceded that prospective Juror 5 did not 
"go into detail" when she answered whether she knew Defendant or 
defense counsel, he believed that there was a "possible issue" that the jury 
was tainted by prospective Juror 5' s response. R.302:58, 60. 
The trial court responded that while it believed that prospective Juror 
5 "ought to be bitch-slapped" for going "beyond the simple question of do 
you know" Defendant or defense counsel, it observed that defense counsel 
did not object to the venire or move for a "mish·ial," but instead agreed to 
excuse Juror 5 without further action "in an effort to try to avoid drawing 
additional attention" to Juror S's response. R.302:59-62, 67-69. The trial 
court then expressed concern that if defense counsel were to move for a 
mistrial now, it would not be timely because jeopardy had attached upon 
-10-
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the jury's swearing in. R.302:61-62. It stated that the "likelihood" that it 
would grant a mistrial motion was now "very slim" and that defense 
counsel might be considered "ineffective" for not having made the motion 
earlier. R.302:66. 
Defense counsel agreed that he had not made a mistrial motion but 
explained that he did not do so because he "didn't want to draw more 
attention from the Jury panel as we were selecting them about what was 
taking place." R.302:63. He further explained that he "thought" the time to 
move for a mistrial "was after the jury was picked" and that he "actually 
want[ed] for the jeopardy to attach." R.302:63, 66. 
Defense counsel asked for time to discuss the matter with Defendant. 
See R.302:70. After consultation, defense counsel moved for a mistrial" due 
to the tainting of the jury due to Juror Number S's comments." R.302:70-71. 
The trial court denied Defendant's mistrial motion on two grounds. 
R.302:71-72. First, it ruled that the motion was untimely. R.302:72. Second, 
it ruled that there was no evidence that the jury was tainted because 
prospective Juror S's statement "occurred early on," "was generic, 
innocuous, non-specific," and "did not specify Defendant's role." R.302:71. 
-11-
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Trial 
Det. Vanderwarf, Agent Ryan, and a forensic scientist from the Utah 
State Crime Lab testified at trial. See R.302. The jury also listened to the 
informant's audio recording of the buy. R.302:119-123; State's Ex. 1. 
Defendant did not put on any evidence. R.302:183-184. Instead, he 
argued that the evidence failed to show that Defendant was involved in the 
transaction. R.302:204-212. Although Defendant admitted that he was the 
only person sitting at the table when the transaction occurred, he pointed 
out that Det. Vanderwarf did not see an actual "hand-to-hand transaction." 
R.302:206. Instead, he claimed that Skittles had really sold the informant the 
drugs: Skittles arranged the buy and he had left the drugs for the informant 
on the table. R.302:204-212. He argued that the informant had taken the 
drugs from the table and then replaced it with the money. Id. 
The jury was not persuaded. It found Defendant guilty of one count 
of distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. R.45; 
R.302:220. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of one-to-
fifteen years to run consecutively to his sentences in three other cases. 
R.181-182; R.303:9-10. 
Defendant timely appealed after the h·ial court reinstated his time to 
appeal. R.256, 259, 268. 
-12-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that prospective Juror S's comment that she knew 
Defendant or defense counsel through her former job on the strike force 
tainted the jury panel because it may have informed them that Defendant 
was involved with drugs. He argues that his trial counsel should have 
moved for a mistrial on this ground before the jury was sworn because-
according to hhn-well-established law requires a mistrial motion be made 
before the jury is sworn. And he asserts that the trial court likely would 
have granted the motion had trial counsel made it before, not after, the jury 
was sworn. 
Defendant's argument fails because defense counsel did not perform 
deficiently; nor did Defendant suffer any prejudice. 
Defendant's argument about trial counsel's timing on the mistrial 
motion misunderstands the law. The governing rule does require 
challenging the panel before the jury is sworn. But it restricts challenges to 
the panel to a failure to follow the statutory procedure for selecting, 
drawing, summoning, and return of the venire. It does not permit 
challenges to the entire panel based on information that may taint the jury's 
ability to decide the case impartially. 
-13-
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Trial counsel properly chose to postpone that challenge. Moving for a 
mistrial in front of the entire panel 1nay have emphasized for the jurors who 
would decide his case the comment that he now says may have suggested to 
them that he was involved in other crimes. And even if counsel could have 
moved for a mistrial outside of the venire's hearing and before the jury was 
sworn, the motion could have succeeded only on a showing of individual 
bias. But to ferret that out would have required voir dire on the very thing 
counsel sought to avoid emphasizing for the jury. And although even that 
1notion should ordinarily be made before the jury is sworn, trial courts may 
consider a mish·ial motion made after the jury is sworn if it is made before 
any evidence has been presented. 
In any event, Defendant suffered no prejudice. Defendant contends 
that the trial court likely would have granted the motion had counsel made 
it before the jury was sworn. The court's ruling shows otherwise. Although 
the court denied the motion on timeliness grounds, it also denied it on the 
merits. 
And whether the trial court would have granted the motion is not the 
full 1neasure of prejudice. Rather, defendant must prove that a biased jury 
tried him. He has not met and cannot meet that burden. First, prospective 
Juror S's comment did not likely prejudice the jury because she did not 
-14-
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indicate with whom she had "affiliations" -defense counsel or Defendant. 
Second, the timing of Defendant's mistrial motion did not matter because 
the trial court alternatively denied the motion on the merits. Third, the jury 
eventually heard testimony on the very thing defendant complains 
prospective Juror S's comment may have informed them about-the agents 
in the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force were familiar with Defendant. 
And they heard evidence that Defendant admitted that he had sold drugs 
before. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL COULD NOT HA VE CHALLENGED THE 
ENTIRE VENIRE BASED ON POSSIBLE BIAS, AND HE 
PROPERLY POSTPONED HIS MISTRIAL MOTION ON 
THAT BASIS TO A VOID EXPOSING THE JURY TO 
MATTERS THAT MAY HAVE SUGGESTED DEFENDANT 
WAS INVOLVED IN OTHER CRIMES; DEFENDANT HAS 
NOT PROVED PREJUDICE IN ANY EVENT 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant 
must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel performed deficiently and (2) he 
was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 
694 (1984); State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ifl9, 12 P.3d 92. Because 
Defendant has shown neither, his argument fails. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel should have moved for a 
n1ish·ial before the jury was sworn on the grounds that prospective Juror 5' s 
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"prejudicial comments ... tainted the jury panel during voir dire." Br.Aplt. 
8. He further claims that defense counsel's late action prejudiced him 
because "if trial counsel had timely moved for a mistrial, the district court 
would have likely granted it." Br.Aplt. 15. 
Defendant is mistaken on both counts. 
A. Defense counsel properly chose to postpone his mistrial 
motion. 
To prove deficient perfonnance, Defendant must show that his 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This standard presumes that counsel was 
competent. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant can thus prevail only by "rebut[ting] the sh·ong presumption 
that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, iJ19 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). And he can do so "only if there is a lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. King, 2012 UT App 
203, ,I14, 283 P.3d 980 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See 
also Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (holding that "ineffective assistance clahn 
succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or sh·ategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions"). Indeed, Strickland does not require 
counsel to make "futile" motions or arguments. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 
-16-
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,r26, 1 P.3d 546. See also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) 
("Neither speculative claims nor counsel's failure to make futile objections 
establishes ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
Defendant claims that trial counsel improperly postponed the mistrial 
motion until after the jury was sworn. He argues that counsel should have 
known that he had to make the motion before the jury was sworn. 
Defendant misunderstands the interplay between the mistrial motion 
h·ial counsel made and the governing rules. Trial counsel moved for a 
mistrial on the ground that prospective Juror S's comment may have 
informed the jurors that Defendant had committed other crimes. Therefore, 
trial counsel founded the motion on a challenge to the jury's impartiality. 
Challenges to juror bias must be against "an individual juror." Utah R. Crim. 
P. 18(c)(2); (18)(e)(4)-(14) (emphasis added). It requires questioning to 
determine whether a prospective juror is actually biased or cannot "act 
impartially." Id. at 18(e)(14) & advisory committee note. See also State v. 
Flores, 2015 UT App 88, 115, 348 P.3d 361 (explaining that "[v]oir dire 
examination serves two purposes: 'the detection of actual bias ... and the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge"). Cf Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 889 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that "change of venue is warranted when 'the jurors demonstrated 
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actual partiality or hostility that [could] not be laid aside"') (quoting Jeffries 
v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
And while those motions ordinarily should be made before the jury is 
sworn, the trial court may allow a challenge after the jury is sworn, but 
before any evidence has been presented. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). 
Trial counsel properly chose to postpone his motion. After 
prospective Juror S's comments, defense counsel faced two choices: first, he 
could challenge each prospective juror individually to determine if he or she 
was actually biased or unable to act impartially; or second, he could proceed 
with the selection process without challenge or c01n1nent in order to avoid 
drawing any further attention to prospective Juror 5' s responses. Choosing 
to move forward without challenge was an objectively reasonable choice. 
Cf State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, if 26, 314 P.3d 1014, 1023 ("Choosing to 
forgo a limiting instruction can be a reasonable decision to avoid drawing 
attention to unfavorable testimony"); State v. Harter, 2007 UT App 5, if16, 
155 P.3d 116 (holding failure to request limiting instruction was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel because such insh·uction could have drawn 
jury's attention to defendant's flight fr01n police officers). Indeed, defense 
counsel explained to the trial court that he had not moved for a mistrial 
before the jury was sworn because he "didn't want to draw more attention 
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from the Jury panel as we were selecting them about what was taking 
place." R.302:63. 
By postponing the motion, defense counsel could move for a mistrial 
on the same basis, without forcing the trial court to question each individual 
prospective juror and drawing their attention to prospective Juror 5' s 
comment. If defense counsel lost the motion, the jury would be none the 
wiser. And even if defense counsel's choice risked having the motion 
denied as untimely, it was objectively reasonable to take that chance to 
avoid emphasizing prospective Juror 5' s comments by raising the issue 
sooner. For counsel's performance to be constitutionally deficient, "it must 
have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong." Boyd v. Ward, 179 
F.3d 904, 913 (10th Cir. 1999).3 
Defendant has not shown otherwise. He argues that rule 18 requires 
challenging the panel before the jury is sworn. But that rule allows a party 
to challenge the entire panel in only one circumstance: a failure to follow 
the statutory procedure for the selecting, drawing, summoning, and return 
3 Counsel's call was proven correct on the whole. While the h·ial 
court did deny the motion as untimely, it also denied it on the merits. See 
R.302:71 ( denying Defendant's mistrial motion because there was no 
evidence the jury was tainted where prospective Juror 5' s c01nn1ent 
"occurred early on," "was generic, innocuous, non-specific," and "did not 
specify Defendant's role"). 
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of the venire. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(l)(i), (ii) (" A challenge to the panel can 
be founded only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed 
with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel.") (emphasis added). See also State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 
1990) (challenge to entire jury venire for not complying with procedure for 
drawing veniremen). 
Indeed, even though defense counsel could have moved for a mistrial 
after the jury was selected, but before it was sworn, he still could not have 
challenged the entire panel on this ground. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(l)(i), (ii). 
And he could not have made this motion outside of the jury panel's hearing 
at this time-the very event he sought to avoid. See R.55-56. Moreover, 
because the trial court expressed its concerns with prospective Juror 5' s 
comments, defense counsel could very well have reasonably believed that 
the trial court would grant his motion despite his not doing so earlier. 
Because 1noving for a mistrial on the basis that the entire jury venire 
was "tainted" would have been insupportable, defense counsel properly 
chose not to make this futile motion. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, if 26. 
In sum, Defendant has not "overcome the presumption that ... the 
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' See Strickland, 
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466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 
L.Ed. 83 (1955)). He therefore has failed to show deficient performance. 
B. Defendant has not shown that the jury could not decide his 
case fairly. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails because 
he ca1mot show prejudice. Defendant argues that "the trial would have 
turned out differently" because the trial court would likely have granted 
defense counsel's motion if he had made it before the jury was sworn. 
Br.Aplt. 15-16. He further asserts that the outcome would have been 
different "had the jury panel not been exposed to the tainting remark" 
because the evidence against him was weak. Br.Aplt. 17-19. 
To "establish prejudice, Defendant 1nust demonstrate 'a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."' State v. Millward, 2010 UT App 355, 
,I14, 246 P.3d 151 (e1nphasis added) (quoting State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215, 
i112, 164 P.3d 1258). The "likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 
(2011). Defendant thus must show that there was a substantial likelihood 
that the result of trial would have been different. He cannot make such a 
showing here. 
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Filing the motion sooner would not have changed the trial court's 
disposition of it. The trial court also denied it on the merits. 
And succeeding on the motion is not enough. Defendant must show 
that denying result in a trial before a jury that was not impartial. He has not 
shown that prospective Juror S's comment biased the jury. 
Prospective Juror 5' s comments did not clearly show a prior link 
between defendant and law enforcement, or that Defendant had committed 
prior crimes. As the trial court recognized, the comment "occurred early 
on," was "generic, innocuous, non-specific," and "did not specify 
Defendant's role." R.302:71. That was correct. When asked if anyone knew 
either defense counsel or Defendant, prospective Juror 5 answered, "Due to 
my years in law enforcement, yes. I have had affiliations with him, 
especially during the time that I was serving as an agent for the Weber-
Morgan Narcotics Strike Force." R.302:23 (emphasis added). No follow-up 
questions clarified who "him" was. Id. 
The other prospective jurors could have understood that when 
prospective Juror 5 stated that she had" affiliations" through the sh·ike force 
with "him," she was referring to defense counsel, not Defendant. R.302:23 
(emphasis added). Because they knew that prospective Juror 5 worked in 
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law enforcement, they may well have concluded that her "affiliations" were 
with the criminal defense attorney representing Defendant. 
But even if they understood her to refer to Defendant, that does not 
mean they would have drawn the conclusion that Defendant had 
committed prior crimes. His "affiliation[]" could have been understood to 
be as a witness, a victim, or a confidential informant. 
Indeed, Defendant has failed to show more than a speculative 
possibility that the jury venire was prejudiced. But speculation is not 
enough. See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ,r34, 27 P.3d 1115 (holding that 
"Mead must show he was actually prejudiced ... the possibility of prejudice 
alone is insufficient"). Cf LafferhJ v. State, 2007 UT 73, ,I20, 175 P.3d 530, 
(holding that Lafferty' s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request 
jury sequesh·ation where he failed to provide any evidence showing that the 
publicity surrounding the trial created prejudice "among the jurors who 
were actually seated"); Burton v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 249 P.2d 514, 
517 (Utah 1952) (holding that mistrial is necessary only where "fair trial 
cannot be had"); State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, if 41, 24 P.3d 948 (holding that 
Wach did not meet burden to show jurors "could not act in a fair and 
impartial manner"); State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. 1993) (holding that 
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Gibbs failed present any evidence that jurors were affected by prospective 
juror's belief that Gibbs was guilty). 
And the comment could not have prejudiced Defendant. The jury 
heard testimony that members of the strike force were familiar with 
Defendant anyway. Det. Vanderwarf testified that the informant told him 
that they had purchased the baggie from "Carl." R.302:116, 122-123. Det. 
Vanderwarf testified that he had heard the name Carl before while working 
on the strike force. R.302:116. And he testified that other agents on the 
strike force were also "familiar" with Defendant; even bringing him a photo 
of Defendant to identify. R.302:117. And they heard Det. Vanderwarf's 
testimony that Defendant admitted he had sold drugs before. So the 
unchallenged and admissible evidence established the very thing Defendant 
says prospective Juror S's comment may have implied-he was involved in 
selling drugs. Cf Gardner, 568 F.3d at 888-889 (holding that prospective 
jurors' knowledge of facts of case did not deprive Gardner of fair trial where 
he did not show fair jury could not be seated) 
Indeed, the evidence against Defendant was strong. Det. Vanderwarf 
testified that the informant bought the drugs from Defendant, not Skittles. 
Indeed, the undisputed evidence was that no one but Defendant was near 
the infonnant during the exchange. See R.302:139, 171-172. 
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Det. Vanderwarf testified that there were no drugs on the table when 
they first arrived and that Defendant was "preparing" something while 
they waited. R.302:133, 139. And the jury listened to the audio recording 
that corroborated Det. Vanderwarf's account. R.302:119-123; State's Ex. 1. 
And they heard testimony that Defendant admitted that he had recently 
sold drugs. R.302:126, 140. 
Moreover, the jury was instructed that Defendant was presumed 
innocent and that the jury must base its decision only on the evidence 
presented at trial. R.53 (Jury Instr. 8); R.55 (Jury Instr. 10); R.87 (Jury Instr. 
37). Appellate courts "presume" that juries follow the instructions. See 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271-273 (Utah 1998) (holding that juries are 
presumed to follow jury instruction to "disregard inadmissible evidence 
inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability 
that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong 
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the 
defendant'") (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987)); Tooele 
Associates Ltd. P'ship v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214, ,I 11, 284 P.3d 709, 713 
("[W]e presume that the jury followed the jury insh·uctions."); State v. 
Nelson, 2011 UT App 107, ,I4, 253 P.3d 1094 ("In the absence of the 
appearance of something persuasive to the conh·ary, we assume that the 
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jurors were conscientious in performing ... their duty, and that they 
followed the instructions of the court.") ( quoting State v. Burk, 859 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah App. 1992). 
Because Defendant has failed to show any prejudice, his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim fails. Millward, 2010 UT App 355, if 14. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts- Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, 1nanufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results 
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with 
respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, 
supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a 
controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in 
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or 
IV, or marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule Vis 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) 
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate 
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
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the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or dish·ibuting controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of 
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the 
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent 
conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
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(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances 
as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)( d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in 
the person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the 
death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4 (2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-
37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious 
bodily injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation 
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of Subsection 58-37-8 (2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same 
episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other 
authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any 
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
( 4) Prohibited acts D--Penal ties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Iinitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
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(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-
501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delive1y, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
76-8-311.3. 
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection 
(4) would have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under this Subsection ( 4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not 
apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
( d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to ilnprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and 
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(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation 
of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a 
plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance 
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, 
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance 
with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this 
chapter. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not 
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima fade evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course 
of the veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing 
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the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the 
veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of 
the officer's employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any 
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(v), who uses, possesses, or 
transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection 
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-
37-2(1 )(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as 
defined in Subs_ection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the 
peyote was used, possessed, or h·ansported by an Indian for bona fide 
h·aditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an 
affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but 
not later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice 
for good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the 
lack of timely notice. 
( d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this 
Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is 
established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or 
administered a controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person: 
(i) was engaged in medical research; and 
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances 
under Section 58-37-6. 
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or 
dispensed a controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
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(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person1s body, a 
controlled substance listed inSection 58-37-4.2 if: 
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a 
valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and 
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher. 
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that 
is less restrictive than any provision of this chapter. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 18. Selection of the Jury 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the 
parties at a preh·ial conference or otherwise prior to h·ial. The following 
procedures for selection are not exclusive. 
(a)(l) Strike nnd replace method. The court shall smnmon the nu1nber of the 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional nu1nber as will allow 
for any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all 
challenges for cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call 
jurors in randmn order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for 
cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may 
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause 
outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, 
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may 
be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the 
clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning 
with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its pere1nptory challenge to one 
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory 
challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining 
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called 
shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors 
called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to 
voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to 
h·y the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, 
for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause 
granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in randon1 
order. The judge may hear and detennine challenges for cause during the 
course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the request 
of any party, shall hear and detennine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peren1ptory challenge to one juror at a 
time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. 
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors 
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
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(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by 
computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of 
the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, 
the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by 
such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective 
jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to 
exa1nining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the 
case. The court 1nay permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preli1ninary 
state1nent of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(c)(l) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the 
h·ial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all 
jurors sum1noned and may be taken by either party. 
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, smn1noning and return of the panel. 
(c)(l)(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set 
forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel 
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of 
jurors to proceed. 
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court 1nay, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for ca use the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be 
given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other 
I.,, 
-
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felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor 
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than 
one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory 
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard 
and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be 
examined as a wih1ess on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause 
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the 
court may re1nove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(e)(l) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law. 
(e)(2) Any mental or physical infinnity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror. 
( e) (3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged 
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution 
was instituted. 
(e)(4} The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritis1n. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or 
a political subdivision thereof. 
(e)(S) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by the 
defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
(e)(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment. 
(e)(7) Having served on a h·ial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged. 
(e)(8) Having been one of a jury fonnally sworn to try the sa1ne charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after 
the case was submitted to it. 
(e)(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant 
for the act charged as an offense. 
(e)(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the juror's views on 
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
the juror's duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions of the court 
and the juror's oath in subsection (h). 
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(e)(l 1) Because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or e1nploy1nent, the carrying on 
of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense. 
(e)(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the 
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury. 
(e)(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged. 
(e)(l4) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circu1nstances that 
reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. 
No person 1nay serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced 
the juror can and will act impartially and fairly. 
(f) Peren1ptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the 
defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory 
challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be in1paneled. Alternate jurors, in 
the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the tune the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, bec01ne unable or disqualified to perform their 
duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory 
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected 
at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, 
shall be subject to the same exa1nina tion and challenges, shall take the same oath 
and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. 
Except in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a 
principal juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict. 
The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin 
deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of then1 will well and h·uly try the matter in issue 
between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence and the 
insh·uctions of the court. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
would be genealogy, needle work, gardening, those kinds of 
things. 
THE COURT: When your husband was employed what did he do? 
MS. He was the animal control officer for Roy 
City for 33 years. ~ 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. ARNOLD: I'd ask the previous gentleman his prior 
employment. He said they're retired, but did not mention--
THE COURT: Oh, yes. Mr. 
did before you retired please? 
will you tell us what you 
MR. Yes. I worked at Hill Air Force Base in a 
pricing situation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. And my wife was also a teacher, school 
teacher. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. ? 
MS. My name is I reside in 
I! 
North Ogden. I'm married with two teenagers. I recently 
retired as a sergeant with the Riverdale Police Department. 
I~ 
My 
husband recently retired from the Weber County Sheriff's Office 
and now is in private probation and spare time hobbies, we like 
to camp. I like to run and spend time with my family. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. .? 
MR. Yeah. My name is< I, I 
live in Roy. I'm married. Have two little girls. One is about 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
THE COURT: --Ms. ? 
MS. Yeah. I'm ,. I live in 
Ogden. I am separated. I have three kids: 8, 13 and 14. I'm 
currently unemployed and spare time is painting, spending time 
with my kids, playing outdoors. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. ? 
MS. All right, my name is I live 
in Ogden City. I am currently single. No children. I work in 
a bakery and a pizza delivery and spare time really it's just 
camping and reading. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you and finally Ms. ? 
MS. I am C I live in Uintah. I am 
~arried. I have three children. I have an almost two year-old, 
a seven year-old and a nine year-old and right now I currently 
stay at home with my family. My spouse's occupation, he's the 
chief technical officer at Mountain Alarm and I like to read, 
workout, hang out with my family as a hobby. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right ladies and gentlemen, 
I'm now going to ask the attorneys to introduce themselves, the 
parties and witnesses to see if you know or are acquainted with 
any of these individuals. Mr. Arnold you may proceed first. 
M?. ARNOLD: Hello. My name is Gage Arnold. I work for 
the Weber County Attorney's Office. I'm Lhe prosecutor in this 
case. I've worked in the Weber County Attorney's Office for 
about three years. Seated here to my left is Jason Vanderwarf. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
He is a detective of the Roy City Police Department. We also 
expect to call as witnesses in this case Courtney Ryan who is a 
Deputy with the Weber County Sheriff's Office and also Beau 
Smith. She is a forensic--well she's a toxicologist with the 
Utah State Crime Lab and she tests controlled substances and 
also I guess we should probably include Teresa Small. She's an 
evidence custodian for the Ogden City Police Department. 
Does anyone know me or any of the people that I've listed? 
I see a few hands. Ms. ? 
MS. Do you want me to stand? 
MR. ARNOLD: If you would. Thank you. 
MS. I know Jason. 
MR. ARNOLD: From work I would suppose? 
MS. Yeah, work. We're friends. 
MP,. ARNOLD: Okay, great. Mr. ? 
MR. My wife went to school here with Gage and was 
friends with him and I also went to school and played sports 
with Courtney Ryan. 
MR. ARNOLD: I guess let me ask you Mr. is there 
anything about the relationship, the fact that I went to school 1 
with your wife or that we played sports with Mr. Ryan, is there 
anything about that that would cause you to favor one side over 
the other? 
MR. I would say no. I don't really know you as 
much. It was more my wife went to school with you. I'm just 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
familiar with you. I met you. Courtney, I haven't seen him 
since high school really. So, yeah. Nothing. 
MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. I believe [inaudible) 
WOMAN: I know Jason through mutual friends and Courtney 
Ryan is the step-father to my nieces and nephews. 
MR. ARNOLD: Is there anything about that relationship 
that would cause you to favor one side or the other? 
WOMAN: No. 
MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young would you like to conduct any 
follow-up on either of these three witnesses at this time? 
MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right. Mr. Young let me 
allow you to introduce yourself and any witnesses you intend to 
call. 
MR. YOUNG: My name is Sean Young. I'm a criminal defense i\ 
attorney here in Ogden. This is Carl Courtney. He's the 
defendant in this case and we intend to possibly call Mr. 
Courtney as our only witness in this case. Does anybody know 
myself or Mr. Courtney? 
MS. Due to my years in law enforcement, yes. I 
have had affiliations with him, especially during the time that 
I was serving as an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force. 
WOMAN: Mr. Young represented my husband in a case. 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
MR. YOUNG: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right ladies and gentlemen, as I indicated 
to you at the outset this is a criminal trial in which the 
defendant Carl Mack Courtney, Jr. has been charged by 
information which has been duly filed with the commission of 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. To the best of your knowledge and memory has any one 
of you heard or read anything about this case? If so would you 
please raise your hand? All right, I don't see any hands 
raised. 
GENTLEMAN: Sorry. 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. 
GENTLEMAN: Previously to today? 
THE COURT: Yes, previous to today. 
GENTLEMAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right, the next questions go to your prior 
jury service. If any of you have had the opportunity to serve 
on a jury previously, please raise your hand. All right. What 
I'd like to know, starting with you Mr. , is when your 
jury service was, what kind of case it was if you remember and 
what the result of that case was, what the outcome was. 
MR. I believe it was 1982. It was Judge 
Wahlquist's Court. I had one other previous jury duty, but it 
was in Mississippi a couple years prior to that before my moving 
out here. The case here was a civil case. Well, I guess you 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
teenager. So--
THE COURT: Okay. Okay, the next question. Would any of 
you have difficulty in affording the defendant his guarantee of 
being considered innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt or stated differently would any of you believe 
that because the defendant has been charged in this case by the 
State that there must be some basis for his guilt? 
Ms. . before you respond, perhaps what we ought to 
do--may I see counsel at the bench for just a moment please? 
Will you hold off on your response? Thank you. 
(Discussion at bench.] 
THE COURT: We dodged a bullet the first time. 
MR. YOUNG: No, we didn't. We--
THE COURT: Well I mean I guess what I'm saying is we 
didn't dwell on it. We didn 1 t linger on it. I recognize what 
you're saying, but the problem is there's no way to anticipate 
that she would say what she said. I mean--
MR. ARNOLD: But the question was do you know Carl. I 
knew that she would strike. 
MR. YOUNG: There's no previous strike orders. 
MR. ARNOLD: Well, we don't, but you know she's been at 
Riverdale P.D. for a long time. 
THE COURT: Well I don't think there's any question that 
she is gone. I guess the bigger issue though is I don't want 
her tainting the pool and if we have an issue now where you 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
already feel that she has done that, then we need to make a 
record on it because I don't want to plow through, pick a jury 
of eight and then have this become an issue. I mean I guess I 
don't know how we're going to determine whether she has tainted 
the pool or not. 
MR. ARNOLD: I mean what if we stipulate that she be 
excused? 
THE COURT: Now? 
MR. ARNOLD: Now. 
MR. YOUNG: But that's kind of [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well you tell me what you--
MR. YOUNG: I don't know how to handle this. I don't know 
how to handle this. We can take her back in chambers. We can 
always take her back in chambers or everyone is going to know 
what's going on. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Then if I don't take her back in 
chambers, then I just allow her response in open Court. What do 
I do? She stood up now. I've got to do something. 
MR. ARNOLD: I would say that we--I mean given her prior 
you know, I mean relationship with the facts, I mean the Strike 
Force and everything, I think we need to just cut her right here 
and just say thank you. 
MR. YOUNG: (inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well let me try to handle it in a different 
way. I think what I'm going to do is I'm going to ask her if 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
her husband is I know he is. He's a probation 
guy from Alliance--or, no, Utah Alternative and I 1 m just going 
to indicate this from the fact that her husband works in my 
Court that maybe it would be appropriate to let her go and I 
won't even draw attention to the law enforcement, Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force [inaudible] I'll just connect it to the 
probation issue. Kick her loose for that reason and just leave 
it alone. 
MR. YOUNG: You can just tell them that [inaudible] 
because her husband is working for--
THE COURT: No. I think I 1 m just going to let her go 
because the real--
MR. YOUNG: Have her walk out right now? 
THE COURT: Well if I base it on the probation connection, 
I don't think I create a problem. The problem that I have is if t 
\ 
\~ 
I leave her here, what are we going to do every time there's a ·: 
I 
question? She's going to stand up and I 1 m going to shut her {: 
down and it just draws more attention to her. 
MR. YOUNG: If she walks out right now. 
THE COURT: Well all it does is draw attention to the fact ' 
that her husband is a probation officer in my Court and for that 
reason I'm going to just act like--
MR. YOUNG: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well, okay, but then what do you--
MR. YOUNG: I don't know that that's the best way to 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 7/15/2013 
handle it. 
THE COURT: Well, but you've got to do more than tell me 
that you don't like my approach. You've got to offer a 
suggescion. 
MR. YOUNG: That's the best approach as possible at this 
point, what you're suggesting. 
THE COURT: I think I say well you're likely to be 
excused. If I leave her there then every question I ask has the 
potential for her--
MR. ARNOLD: What about some follow-up? Excuse her and 
then follow-up with the jurors based on--
THE COURT: We 11, I had no idea she was going to say she 
knew Mr. Courtney. 
MR. ARNOLD: I had no idea. I had no idea. 
THS COURT: I mean I thought she would say she knew you. 
I didn't know she would say she knew [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: That's [inaudible] I agree. That's what I 
would--
THE COURT: And once it was out there was nothing I could 
do. I couldn't unring the bell. Well, you tell me what you 
want to do. If you feel that because of that the jury has been 
tainted, because I mean that sort of goes to the whole 404 
issue. You weren't going to get into 404 unless they opened the 
door. Well she kind of did that in a very roundabout way 
without being specific. 
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MR. ARNOLD: I agree. 
THE COURT: But I mean I'll--
MR. ARNOLD: What if we did this? She's excused based on 
the probation [inaudible} and then some colloquy, some 
questions. You heard this witness or this potential juror talk 
about her relationship with Mr. Courtney. Do any of you 
jurors--has that affected--are you able to maintain--
THE COURT: What do you think about trying to ferret out 
the reason [inaudible] The problem is it's a loaded question. 
If ~hey're smart, they say yes and they know they're gone. 
That's the problem. 
MR. ARNOLD: That's true. [inaudible] 
MR. YOUNG: Well, if they want to be on the jury, they'll 
say no. They're tainted. 
THE COURT: And they say no. I understand. Well I don't 
profess to have all the answers. 
MR. YOUNG: I have less answers than you. 
THE COURT: Well I I m not sure that you do. 
MR. YOUNG: Let's get her out on the probation itself. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Ms. l, before you answer, I was discussing with Mr. 
Young and Mr. Arnold, both attorneys who are assigned to my 
Court on Thursdays, if Mr. 
to my Court is your husband. 
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THE COURT: Okay. I · ... 1asn' t sure when you said that and I 
was trying to make the connection and then it occurred to me 
he's relatively new in his position with the probation company 
that he works for. Is that right? 
MS. I: Right. 
THE COURT: I mean not brand new, but new enough that I 'm 
just not used to having him all the time. The discussion that 
we had at the bench was based on the fact that your husband 
comes to my Court every Thursday as a probation officer for that 
private probation company, I think it would be better to just 
excuse you at this time. I think that just the fact that I have 
that, that he's working in my Court with other probation 
entities, I think creates enough of an issue that beyond your 
own experiences and things, I think that's probably enough. 
So rather than have you stay here only to excuse you at 
the end, I think what we'll do is just let you get on your way 
now if that's okay with you. 
MS. That's fine with me Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MS. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Appreciate your time. All right. So let me 
repeat the question and I apologize for the interruption. 
any of you have difficulty in affording the defendant his 
guarantee of being considered innocent until proven guilty 
Would 
beyond a reasonable doubt or stated another way would any of you 
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believe that because the defendant has been charged in this case 
by the State, that there must be some basis for his guilt? All 
right. I don't see any hands raised. Thank you. 
Would any of you give greater weight and/or credibility to J 
law enforcement testimony over other witnesses' testimony simply[;! 
because the testimony is coming from a law enforcement officer 
without listening to it and evaluating it? You just 
automatically assume that it's more believable because it comes 
from a law enforcement officer. Would any of you feel that way? 
Okay. I don't see any hands raised. Thank you. 




are selected as a juror in this matter, your responsibility will :: 
be to determine and weigh the facts of this case. You are going 
to do that from the evidence that's presented here in the 
Courtroom and from your own common sense and experience. My 
responsibility is to instruct you in the law that is to be 
applied to the facts as you find them. I can't interfere with 
your responsibility to find the facts. You are however 
obligated to follow the law as I instruct you on the law. Are 
there any of you that believe you would not be willing to follow 
the law as I give it to you? All right. 
Finally, and this question may come off initially as a 
little confusing, but I think you 1 ll understand what we're 
driving at. I would like each of you :o place yourself in the 
position of the plaintiff or the State and the defendant in this 
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lawsuit. If you were in their positions selecting a jury, are 
there any of you who would not want a juror with your present 
views or state of mind sitting in judgment? If so would you 
raise your hand? This is the sort of mirror question where it 
asks you to look at yourself in the mirror and say would I want 
me judging me? I don't see any hands. Thank you. 
Mr. Arnold are there any additional questions that you 
would like the Court to ask the panel at this time? 
MR. ARNOLD: No. That's fine. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young any additional questions you would 
like me to ask or any follow-up you would like to conduct? 
MR. ARNOLD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Counsel then may I see 
you at the bench again and I apologize for this white noise. I 
know it's terrible. It's the State of Utah's best way in which 
to block out the sound that's occurring here at the bench. 
You'd think they could provide you wich some nice elevator music 
or something, but instead we give you this horrible white noise. 
So I apologize. It's what they gave me. 
[Discussion at bench.) 
THE COURT: All right. The Jeopardy tune. That would be 
good as well. Okay. So let's see. I need to make that note 
that I let Ms.--where is she? Oh, yeah, right there--that I 
excused her. All right let's just work our way down. Any 
problem with number l? 
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BAILIFF: No. That's the only one that's clean. Every 
other one I saw had something up here, defense, bailiff, in 
Court clerk. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then I'll hand that to you. 
BAILIFF: Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold do you pass the jury for cause? 
MR. ARNOLD: I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young do you pass the jury for cause? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Now ladies and gentlemen each of 
the parties has a chance to disqualify four of you from serving 
on the jury for a total of eight. They can do that for any 
reason and you shouldn't take it personally. I wouldn't imagine 
that you would. You'd probably celebrate actually, but some 
people, believe it or not, get offended. I mean they walk out 
thinking why in the world didn't they select me? I'm the 
perfect juror. If they were to have, you know, in the 
dictionary juror, my picture should be there because I'm the 
person that should be on this jury and all I can tell you is 
that when I was an attorney, before I became a judge, I had my 
own theories of the kinds of people ~hat I wanted on my jury and 
when I won, my theories were validated and when I lost, I went 
back to the drawing board and reconsidered my theories. 
They can excuse you for any reason. They can look at the 
clothing you're wearing, the way you comb your hair, what you do 
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BAILIFF: So we have 
THE COURT: All right ladies and gentlemen, now that 
you're comfortable in your seats, I'm going to ask you to stand, 
raise your right hand and my Clerk is going to swear you in as 
the Jury that's been selected in this case. 
THE JURY PANEL IS SWORN. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may be seated. Now 
as I indicated to you, I'm going to let you take a short break 
to use the restroom, make phone calls, get a drink, whatever you 
need to do and then when you come back in I will read you the 
initial set of jury instructions, invite the attorneys to make 
their opening statements and begin presenting evidence and then 
we'll just kind of see where we are time wise. 
Now that I've got you there, do you have any thoughts 
about how you would like me to handle the lunch, whether you 
would like a shorter lunch or a longer lunch? Nobody has a 
preference? Counsel, back at 1:30 or 1:00? What would you 
prefer? 
MR. ARNOLD: Could we see how far we get? 






MR. ARNOLD: Is that okay? -
THE COURT: That's fine. You bet. 
MR. ARNOLD: Just during the break we've got a few things 
to set up. 
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•,' 
•i 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, then we'll be in recess for ~ 
let's say--what do you think? Ten minutes is adequate? 
MR. ARNOLD: At least ten. 
MR. YOUNG: Go 15 just to be safe. 
MR. ARNOLD: Let's go 15. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess for 15 minutes. 
•.,:' 
That should be plenty of time for you to get oriented in the i 
back and then we'll reconvene and proceed as I've outlined. Any I;: 
questions that you have of a general nature? Okay, thank you. 
BAILIFF: Okay, just a reminder. On that back row, watch 
that step. We did have one juror take a twnble off of there. 
(Jurors leave the Courtroom.] 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect we're 
outside of the presence of the jury. Anything that we need to 





MR. YOUNG: Possibly. I'd like to make a record at least J 
of what took place with Juror Number 5. 
THE COURT: All right, you go ahead. 
MR. YOUNG: Just to the possible jury tainting issue with 
what happened with Number 5. Officer was actually 
involved in controlled buys with my client before. He testified 
at a grand jury on issues where she set up controlled buys when 
she was a Weber-Morgan Strike ?orce Agent. She made comments to 
tha~ end here today Lhat she knew my client due to her 
involvement with che Weber-Morgan Strike Force department, when 
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she was working with them. She made reference knowing my client 
in that capacity in front of all the jurors. 
So I mean there's a possible issue. You know, I was 
looking not at her, but other jurors' faces as she was making 
the comments and there were a couple of jurors that kind of you 
know piped up when they were listening to what she was saying 
and so you know there might be some issues with 404(b) evidence 
where my client doesn't testify about prior bad acts coming in 
and she's now told them about her prior involvement. She didn't 
go into detail like I am now, but she made reference to the fact 
that she knew my client due to her involvement in the Strike 
Force work in the past. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold? 
MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, I mean we knew that Ms. 
was a law enforcement officer and what was absolutely surprising 
was the fact that she knew and responded to the question of 
knowing Mr. Courtney. I think that what the Court has done by 
excusing her based on another reason, I think that we're safe to 
proceed at this point. 
THE COURT: Let me make a record. Counsel approached. We 
discussed prior to Ms. answering the question that 
pertained to whether or not she could afford the defendant his 
presumption of innocence or whether she would assume that simply, 
because he had been charged that he was guilty of the offense 
and she raised her hand. Before allowing her to respond the 
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Court invited counsel to the bench. We discussed the 
difficulties that were created by Ms. 's unanticipated 
answer to the question that we always ask; which is do any of 
you jurors know either of the attorneys or any of the witnesses 
and we always include of course the defendant, not anticipating 
Ms. would go into detail about how she knew Mr. 
Courtney, but rather just that she did. I think again to make 
the record clear, she indicated that she knew Mr. Courtney and 
was familiar with him from other cases and then I think as you 
correctly noted Mr. Young, I think she did specify from her work 
with--I don't know the words she used exactly, but her 
association for sure with the Weber-Morgan Narcotic Strike 
Force. 
There was no follow-up done. The Court did not inquire 
into any of the specifics. Allowed the questioning to proceed 
with the other jurors. No follow-up was conducted from counsel 
at tha~ time or any other time with Ms. and in an 
effort to try to avoid drawing additional attention to her 
earlier response, when the Court perceived that further 
responses by her could certainly have the potential of tainting 
the Jury, the Court made the determination to excuse her because 
her husband who is a private probation officer working for Utah 
Alternative Programs and is assigned to my Court essentially has 
contact with the Court on a weekly basis and for that reason 
excused Ms. not drawing any additional attention to her 
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Courtney. 
7/15/2013 
I think there was discussion about questioning the 
remaining members of the Jury to determine to what extent, if 
any, that jury panel was influenced by her responses and I ~ 
think, and if I 1 m wrong about this you correct me, but I think 
the decision was rather than draw more attention to that, we 
would allow the dust to settle and simply move on and excuse her 
and so that was a decision made by counsel and of course with 
the Court's approval as well. 
Anything that you want to clarify about what I 1 ve said? 
MR. YOUNG: The only issue is also that that's when it 
kind of came to the forefront was when the Court asked can 
anybody here not afford him the right of innocence until proven 
guilty. That's when she popped back up and we kind of quashed. 
So I mean she's the only person that raised her hand to that 
question. It kind of drew attention to her again and the Court 
did the best the Court could to quash the issue when it arose, 
but I mean up to that point there's possible bias already and 
maybe tainting of the jury pool at that time. 
THE COURT: Well maybe I just need to ask Mr. Young and 
maybe we need to recess and give you some time to think about 
it, but I sort of broached the subject with counsel at the 
bench. Are you asking the Court to--well, we have a couple of 
problems. 
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MR. ARNOLD: The Jury has been sworn. 
THE COURT: They have, but I think--and you correct me if 
I'm wrong because I've not had this issue. In a jury trial is 
it when the jury is sworn or is it when the first witness takes 
the stand? 
MR. YOUNG: When the jury is sworn. 
MR. ARNOLD: When the jury is sworn. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, so the problem that I have is I 
invited a challenge to going forward. I said are you making the 
claim that the jury has been tainted and we should not have a 
trial and that motion was never brought or even alluded to at 
the bench. 
MR. YOUNG: Well I said I needed to make--I thought I said 
up there pretty clearly that I need to make a record of this at 
some point, but there was never a break again between the Jury 
being selected. I didn't know at what point to make that. The 
Jury was in the room the whole time, but I did allude to the 
fact up there I needed to make a record of this, make a--at 
least put on the record my objection to it. I thought I made 
that pretty clear up at the bench. 
MR. ARNOLD: The issue--I have to go back and read my 
rifth ~.mendment stuff, but I think that once the Jury is sworn, 
I mean all bets are off for the State. 
TH~ COURT: Jeopardy attaches. 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
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MR. ARNOLD: Jeopardy attaches. All bets are off for the 
State. We've got to move forward with where we're going and 
however the case may be or may result, but I mean there was 
some--I thought that from the conversation that we had that the 
dust had settled as the Court had indicated and so I don't think 
that the objection at this point is timely, if it is an 
objection. 
THE COURT: And I think that's my concern is that I don't 
feel like there was ever a formal--I mean there was reference 
made to making a record, but never a formal indication that a 
motion to declare a mistrial and re-set the trial was ever made. 
I mean I think Mr. Young expressed concerns as did the Court, 
but I don't think the Court was advised that there was going to 
be a motion for mistrial. 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. I didn't make that motion. 
THE COURT: And I want to make that clear because I think 
it does affect the procedure and the way I handled it because 
had I anticipated that, I would have entertained that motion 
prior to swearing the Jury in of course to avoid the jeopardy 
issues and because I didn't perceive that that motion was going 
to be brought, I went ahead and swore the Jury in and then 
allowed us to just make this record for the sake of making a 
record. 
MR. YOUNG: But see? I haven't had a chance to talk to my 
client about his concerns about it either. I mean we just kept 
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rolling so I thought--and I missed the Court swearing the Jury. 
I was re-organizing and shifting sides and wasn't paying 
attention when you were swearing the Jury in. So I actually 
want for the jeopardy to attach, but I wasn't paying attention 
as I was going on. I was trying to re-arrange and my client was 1 
~: 
asking me a question and so I didn't catch the issue, but I had 
every intention of bringing it to the record because he leaned 
over and made some comments to me. I didn't want to draw more 





what was taking place, but he does have a concern about the jury \ 
pool being tainted based on Juror Number S's comments. 
THE COURT: Well I don't quibble with Mr. Courtney's 
concerns. I think the issue is that it was discussed at the 
bench Mr. Courtney. I asked the attorneys if they wanted to 
conduct follow-up to ferret out whether or not there was that 
taint and the response that I received is no. We don't want to 
further the problem. We don't want to make it worse than 
perhaps it already is. 
~ So we're just going to leave it alone because she made one ~ 
comment and it was quite some time ago, kind of early on in the 
voir dire. I mean at the very beginning of the voir dire when 
the jury was asked do you know Mr. Young or Mr. Courtney and I'm 
just going to find at this point in time that there has not a 
motion been made. There wasn't one made at the time she made 
the response. There could have been one made at that juncture. 
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The minute the response was made we could have excused the 
panel and you could have made that motion right at that moment 
or we could have had discussion about ferreting out the 
poisoning effect, if any, that the rest of the jurors 
experienced from her response. That was not done and even as 
late as right before the jury was selected there was no motion 
made and so I'm just going to find that at this point the motion 
is untimely. 
I think the concerns have been expressed and placed on the 
record. I respect them. Ms. made one comment and was 
not allowed to answer the second question when she stood up. I 
stopped her from responding and then that was when we excused ~ 
her. So we have the one response on the record. I think you've 
indicated what that was and so we're going to move forward. 
I mean to the extent that you are making a motion for 
mistrial, and I don't know that you are, because you haven't, 
but I mean are you making that motion? 
MR. YOUNG: Well I haven't had a chance to discuss that 
with my client. I'd like to--I mean I guess during this recess 
I can discuss that with my client. I haven't had a chance to 
discuss it. 
THE COURT: Okay. You talk to your client about it and 
let me know. Anything else? 
MR. ARNOLD: I don't have anything currently. I think Mr. 
Young, nothing that we can't handle, but we may just need a few 
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extra minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Understood. Thank you. 
[RECESS.) 
[Discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: I'm not trying to make more of this than needs 
to be made, but I have a couple of concerns that I'd like to 
just kind of flush-out and express the first of which is this. 
I think, and I understand how we get on a roll and we things 
just keep going and going and going and it's difficult to kind 
of call a time out and say I need to go talk to my client. I 
mean I understand logistically how that can be awkward. 
The flip side is as I'm looking back over this selection 
process I'm thinking there were plenty of chances we had to try 
to cure it or fix it before we swore the Jury in. I mean and as 
I reflect en some of the thi~gs we could have done, well one of 
them would have been right at that moment to either make the 
motion or approach and make the motion or start calling the 
jurors back individually so as to not have them answering in 
front of everybody and asking them you know is there anything 
,, 
" -, 
about what Ms. said that you feel is going to influence ½ 
you? We didn't do that, okay? It is what it is. I'm not being , 
critical. I'm just saying we were all trying to figure out how 
to solve it and we were struggling. 
So now we're in a posture where you haven't made a motion. 
You may make the motion. I don't know if you will or won't, 
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but the likelihood that I 1 m going to grant it is very slim 
mostly because of untimeliness. So great for you, right? I 
mean in the sense that you don't have to worry about jeopardy 
attaching and him walking, but the bigger problem that I have is 
we always have looming out there ineffective assistance of 
counsel, always, and despite attorneys' best efforts, their 
performance is called into question. 
Here we have what I perceive as a pretty significant 
situation. Maybe you disagree. I don't know what appellate 
counsel would say about Mr. Young's performance with respect to 
this issue and whether he should have done something and didn't. 
MR. ARNOLD: We spoke about that and I think we talked 
that this is probably, at this point, it's untimely. So 
ineffective assistance would be the claim that would be made up 
on appeal. I think that Mr. Young had a reasonable trial 
strategy for not, you know, I guess at the time raising more of 
a raucous. So--
MR. YOUNG: I didn't know where I was supposed to make the 
timely--I thought it was after the jury was picked I was 
supposed to make my [inaudible) Ineffective obviously. I mean 
I brought it to the Court's attention I thought up here where I 
thought I made it pretty clear that I needed to make that a 
record. I thought we were making a record up here. 
THE COURT: Well my issue is I just don't want to try this 
again 1n a year or two years because they send it back on an 
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ineffective assistance. 
MR. ARNOLD: Well that's probable now. 
THE COURT: I mean that's my concern. I'm just being as 
frank as I can be. I just don't want it coming back. 
MR. ARNOLD: I agree. No, I think that there's--
THE COURT: And I don't know how to cure it at this point 
!, 
and maybe we can't and I don't know whether or not there was any i 
•,; ;, 
wiggle room in negotiating. That's still the potential to be 1 
explored. I mean the problem was created through no fault of 
ours. I mean it was created by a juror who quite honestly, in 
my opinion, ought to be bitch-slapped because--
MR. YOUNG: She knew better. 
MR. ARNOLD: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --I mean for her not to understand the 1 
" 'l. ., 
,', 
:ainting that she was creating when she said that, it's hard for I 
me to--
MR. YOUNG: If I had known she was Strike Force I would 
have said something earlier. You knew she was Strike--
MR. ARNOLD: I had heard. I haven't dealt with that. 
THE COURT: But the problem is you still didn't know 
whether she knew him or not. I mean none of ~s knew that--
MR. ARNOLD: No. I had no idea. 
THE COURT: --and the question was a yes or no question. 
MR. YOUNG: No one anticipated it. 
THE COURT: It was not--
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MR. ARNOLD: Does anybody know--
THE COURT: --how do you know. It was just do you know. 
So are we on or off? Okay. I just wanted to make sure. Yeah, 
that's fine. 
COURT CLERK: [inaudible) 
MR. ARNOLD: Yeah. So, I mean as far as the [inaudible) 
I'm not coming off of seconds. He wants thirds. He has earned 
seconds and so I gave him an offer in which we would dismiss 
certain cases of his. The offer is still--I mean I'll leave 
that open currently. If he wants to take the offer, then that's 
2 
fine. } 
THE COURT: I'm just so frustrated with--
MR. YOUNG: [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: [inaudible) 
MR. YOUNG: Well the thing is he thought there was a 
video. We told [inaudible] that we were looking for a video on 
it. We found there's no video. Audio is pretty--I mean you 
can't tell whether he was in the room or not which can be 
Vanderwarf's testimony. Vanderwarf got killed in the papers in 







YOTJNG: It doesn't matter. It's public opinion. 
ARNOLD: Well I mean here's the--you want to 
listen to the tape. 
YOUNG: I've heard the tape. I've heard the 
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THE COURT: Okay. Well it is what it is. I was just 
trying to avoid appeal issues down the road. 
MR. YOUNG: I'm sure there's going to be an appeal. 
THE COURT: It's like I said. That juror should be 
slapped for--I mean that's an extreme statement, but it just 
reflects the frustration of the Court that she would go beyond 
the simple question of do you know and offer what she offered. 





MR. ARNOLD: Then the other option that we have I think is ; 
¥· 
for him to waive--I don't know. 





This is just thinking outside 
could come back on another day. 
MR. YOUNG: I don't think we can waive double jeopardy. 
Can we do it? 
1 
;...: 
1'HE COURT: I don't know. ti 
MR. ARNOLD: I can call over to the office and see what r:1, 
the chiefs think. 
THE COURT: 
what you want to do as far as how we go forward. 
Well it's your guys' case to try. So you do 
If you want to ! 
just call the Jury back in and get going, that's what we'll do. 
I mean I've got the instructions. I'm ready to go. I just 
w3sn 1 t sure if you had thought through the appellate issues that 
are crea~ed by it. 
MP.. ARNOLD: [inaudible] Talk to him about that or just 
go forward? 
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THE COURT: I mean does he want to come back and re-try 
this in a year? I can't imagine he wants to do that any more 
than the rest of us. 
MR. YOUNG: He thinks he's going to win. 
THE COURT: But let's assume he doesn't. 
MR. YOUNG: I've had this conversation with him. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. YOUNG: He can appeal. 
THE COURT: Okay, but my- point is let's assume he wins his 
appeal. He's back here re-trying this case in a year. Does he 
want to do that? I mean do you have--okay. Okay. I'm not 
trying to elicit-- (&;J 
MR. YOUNG: He's got six felony cases pending. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I understand. 
MR. YOUNG: He's going to be in prison that whole time, 
five six times [inaudible] 
MR. ARNOLD: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Okay. Well I guess he'll have to appeal then. 
Do you want to make the motion then before? 
MR. YOUNG: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Okay, before we bring the Jury in, Mr. Young let me turn 
the record over to you. Do you have any motions you wish to 
make? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. I'd like to make a motion for a mistrial 
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!~· 
due to the tainting of the jury due to Juror Number 5 's comments 1: 
[inaudible] 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold a response? 
MR. ARNOLD: I believe that the objection is untimely now 
that the Jury has been sworn. 
T~E COURT: I think the Court is going to find in this 
particular case that this disclosure that we're talking about 
occurred early on in the jury selection process. Specifically, 
it was shortly after each juror indicated their name, residence, 
married or single, children, education, occupation, I 
introduced--the attorneys introduced themselves and their 
witnesses and it was in response to the question do you know Mr. I 
;t 
·i 
Young or Mr. Courtney, his client, that Juror Number 5 responded :f 
that she did through her experience with law enforcement, 
specifically with the Narcotics Strike Force because of other 
case involving Mr. Courtney. 
Now she did not specify Mr. Courtney's role in those other 
cases. Did not indicate whether or not he was a victim in other 
cases, whether he was an informant in other cases. She never 
specified exactly how Mr. Courtney was involved in those other 
cases and so to that extent I think th~ statement was generic, 
innocuous, non-specific. She wasn't allowed to elaborate beyond 
~hat. There was no motion made at th~t time, no motion made 
during any of the rest of jury selection and wi:.en Juror Number 5 
prepared to answe~ the question of whether or not she would be 
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able to afford the d~fendant his presumption of innocence until 
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt its case, she raised 
her hand and was going to respond to that question. Was not 
1; 
allowed to and was then excused because her husband is a private " 
probation officer who is assigned to this Court and that was the 
reason she was excused in an effort to not draw any further 
attention to her earlier response. 
There was discussion at the bench again about how to fix 
the problem. There was no request to individually question each 
of the remaining jurors to determine whether there was taint. 
The decision that was made was to not draw any further attention 
to Juror Number S's earlier response and to proceed with the 
selection process. 
After the attorneys were asked if the jury selected was in 
fact the jury that they had intended to select and each ~ 
responded in the affirmative, and even during the moment in time 11 
when the remaining members of the jury panel were excused and we 
were seating the eight that were selected, no motions were made. 
Attorneys did not ask to approach the bench to discuss the need 
to make a motion and so the jury was subsequently placed under 
oath to serve in this case. 
Based on the numerous opportunities that existed to bring 
this motion previously, I'm going to find that the motion is 
untimely and I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial in this 
case. 
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